STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of MATTHEW VERNON EVERHART, JR., Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

V

JENNIFER ATKINSON,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

MATTHEW EVERHART,

Respondent.

Before: Griffin, P.J., and Cavanagh and Gage, JJ.

MEMORANDUM

Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the family court order terminating her parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (g), (j) and (m); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(ii), (g), (j) and (m). We affirm.

Although respondent-appellant contends that petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights, she challenges the termination of her parental rights under § 19b(3)(b)(ii) only. Because only one statutory ground is necessary to terminate parental rights, *In re McIntyre*, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), and because respondent-appellant does not challenge the termination of her parental rights under the remaining three statutory grounds, i.e., §§ 19b(3)(g), (j) and (m), she is not entitled to appellate relief. *In re JS and SM*, 231 Mich App 92, 98; 585 NW2d 326 (1998); *Roberts & Son Contracting, Inc v North Oakland Development Corp*, 163 Mich App 109, 113; 413 NW2d 744 (1987). MCR 5.974(1); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). In addition, we note that there was overwhelming evidence that respondent failed to protect her one-year old daughter from the severe physical abuse inflicted by her boyfriend. In

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No. 223988 Grand Traverse Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 99-000279-NA any event, we hold the lower court did not clearly err in finding that the four statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence.

We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting several photographs illustrating the nature of the child's sibling's injuries. Evidence of mistreatment of one child is probative of treatment of other children. *In re Jackson*, 199 Mich App 22, 26; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). Even though this evidence was harmful to respondent-appellant, its probative value was not "substantially" outweighed by prejudicial considerations as required by MRE 403.

Affirmed.

/s/ Richard Allen Griffin /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh /s/ Hilda R. Gage